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Abstract 
 
 
This paper considers the question of economic nationalism through the lens of economic 
openness.  Complete economic openness, which connotes close or total integration of a 
country with that of the world economy, is the antonym of economic nationalism.  The 
paper argues that economic openness is a multi-dimensional concept.  A country can be 
open, or not so open to all or some of the following: trade, exports, imports, finance, 
science, culture and education, migration, foreign investment, investment by its citizens 
and companies abroad, among other things.  There is no economic theory that suggests 
that a country has to be open in all dimensions simultaneously. Given its economic and 
geo-political situation, a country may choose to be open in some areas and not in others.  
The paper examines the analytical question: what is the optimum degree of openness for 
an economy?  This theoretical framework is used to illustrate and explain the Asian 
experience, specifically of Japan and Korea.  The implications for policy for these and 
other national economies as well as those for the global economy are outlined.  The main 
policy message of the paper is that countries should seek, whenever they can, “strategic” 
rather than close integration with the international economy.  In that sense economic 
nationalism, notwithstanding globalization is still the order of the day in many Asian 
countries.  They need to maintain national control over volatile capital movements and 
prudently regulate the financial sector in the national interest. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper considers the question of economic nationalism through the lens of economic 
openness. Complete economic integration, which connotes close or total integration of a 
country with that of the world economy, is the antonym of economic nationalism. The 
paper argues that economic openness is a multi-dimensional concept. A country can be 
open or not so open, in all or some of the following directions: trade, exports, imports, 
finance, science, culture, education, migration, foreign investment, investment by its 
citizens and companies abroad, among other things. There is no economic theory that 
suggests that a country has to be open in all dimensions simultaneously. Given its 
economic and geographical situation, a country may choose to be open in some areas and 
not at all, or only partially in others. The paper examines the analytical question: what is 
the optimum degree of openness for an economy? This theoretical framework is used to 
illustrate and explain the Asian experience, especially that of Japan and Korea. The 
implications for policy for these and other national economies as well as those for the 
global economy are outlined. The main policy message of the paper is that countries 
should seek, whenever they can, ‘strategic’ rather than ‘close’ integration with the 
international economy. 
 
At the simplest level a policy of total autarky is not necessarily one that coincides with 
economic nationalism. National economic benefits may increase with some trading 
compared with no trade at all. Orthodox economists would argue that a nation’s gains 
from trade with the rest of the world are best enhanced by the policy of free trade. This 
proposition which has long been a bedrock of orthodox economics is challenged in this 
essay in relation to its theoretical basis and its application in the real world.  It is argued 
that there are only narrow circumstances in which the orthodox proposition is either 
analytically or historically valid. 
 
II. Optimal degree of openness and economic planning   
 
In principal, one can approach the problem of defining the optimal degree of openness in 
two mutually non-exclusive ways.  To start with, an obvious method is to use the theory 
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regarding national planning.  This involves drawing up a suitable model for the economy 
that would include the specification of an appropriate social preference function (or more 
generally, a functional), along with the relevant constraints.1  These constraints will 
typically consist of the quantification of opportunities to transform primary factors into 
desired commodities through either production or trade.  Boundary conditions could be 
inserted to lend the results a greater degree of realism.  The “optimal degree of 
openness”, or the concept of economic nationalism as defined in this paper, will follow as 
a consequence from the exercise of constrained maximization.  The analysis can be cast 
in static or dynamic terms. The solution variables involve production and /or investment 
levels by sectors as well as exports and imports. They can be stated as time paths if the 
relevant model is a time-phased one. 
 
Typically such exercises are carried out in real terms and leave the set of complementary 
monetary magnitudes undetermined.  These are usually worked out with the help of a 
macro-economic model.  There is a considerable literature on this subject and with 
increasing ability to handle complex optimization models on more powerful computers, it 
led to some improvements compared with the initial exercises carried out by Chenery, 
Bruno and several others in the late fifties. 
 
However, there may be many reasons to believe that the approach is not entirely 
satisfactory. While a planning approach does avoid easy and facile identification of the 
optimal degree of openness with a regime of “ free trade” it suffers from a number of 
limitations. First of all, the postulate of a scalar maximand may be quite inappropriate 
unless the degree of homogeneity is extended to future generations as well, not a very 
realistic assumption, to put it mildly. Secondly, the analysis cannot take into account 
issues connected with irreversibility over time excepting by resort to very ad hoc 
procedures. 
 
Thirdly, the only bit of connection of this approach with history is through initial 
1  This part of the paper is based on and updates unpublished notes written by the late Prof. Sukhamoy 
Chakravarty  (an eminent economic planner) and myself.  Interested readers may obtain a copy of these 
notes by application to the author and to the World Institute of Development Economic Research 
(WIDER), Helsinki.   
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specification of vectors of primary factors, which are easily quantifiable. There are no 
simple and convenient ways of quantifying the states of knowledge to the community or 
its degree of absorptive capacity if inflows of factors from the outside world are 
considered to be relevant. 
 
Fourthly, national planning models are rich in details for a single country. However to be 
operationally, meaningful they have to assume that the rest of the world is either going to 
stay constant or change only in a predetermined way. Strategic choices are excluded.  
 
Structural changes arising from conjunctural shifts in the world economy may also not 
come out from the model results as sharply as one would like. 
 
If one were to take these criticisms seriously, then the alternative to planning exercises 
would be a somewhat looser but a more historically grounded approach which not merely 
emphasizes the advantages that are likely to accrue to a national entity from exploring 
opportunities to trade with the rest of the world but also emphasizes certain factors which 
may make it more vulnerable to outside influences.  These may produce long term 
irreversible effects on the country’s pattern of production and its ability to generate 
productive employment, etc 
. 
Such an alternative approach is quite consistent with the paradigm of classical 
economics, including in this respect not only Ricardo, but also Marshall in his capacity as 
a classical economist. Contrary to text book analysis it is important to emphasize here 
that Ricardo was much more concerned with the effects of foreign trade on the rate and 
pattern of accumulation, than with the mere demonstration of the theorem of  
`comparative advantage’, as an exercise in static optimization. When Ricardo pleaded for 
a greater degree of openness of the British economy, he was not being guided merely by 
his artificial example of trade in cloth and wine between England and Portugal, but 
because of the need to capitalize on the emerging features of the British economy in the 
light of revolution in textiles production. Marshall understood this very well when in his 
`Memorandum on the fiscal policy of international trade’, he wrote  “The principles on 
which our present fiscal system was based sixty years ago seem to me to be not ultimate 
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derivative.  They were obtained by applying certain truths, which are as universal as the 
truth of geometry or mechanics, to certain conditions which were transitional” (Marshall, 
1926; p.386).  He displayed a clear understanding of the historical specificity of maxims 
of policy of free trade which have been treated by many as ahistorical  truths. 
 
While Marshall clearly recognised how the changes in configuration of production forces 
can alter the degree and character of openness of the economy, Keynes, it would appear, 
was worried about a somewhat different set of factors when he was devoting his thoughts 
to working out schemes for post-war national reconstruction. This has to do with 
maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments of different countries. As he once put 
it, “ To suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of 
adjustment which preserves equilibrium if only we trust to methods of  ‘laissez-faire’ is a 
doctrinaire delusion which denigrates the lessons of historical experience without having 
behind it the support of sound theory” (Keynes, 1980; pp.21-22). Now it is clear that in 
history there have been periods, which as Keynes himself acknowledged, payments 
arrangements have worked out satisfactorily. This permitted large expansions of trade 
and trade-induced growth. However these have been episodes that have been 
characterised by the presence of suitable conjunctures, as the study of the economy for 
the period after the Second World War, the ‘golden age’, demonstrates (Glyn, Hughes, 
Lipietz and Singh, 1992). 
 
A country wishing to open up when the conjuncture is adverse in Keynes’ sense (that 
different economies are characterized by ‘ persistent surpluses’ or ‘deficits’ without there 
being any mechanism to restore global equilibrium) may benefit much less and, in certain 
cases, may end up being much worse off than if its opening-up process were differently 
timed. 
 
If timing makes a difference, and timing is indeed important, and if returns to scale are 
increasing, openness by virtue of assuring higher levels and growth rates of external 
demand may facilitate major structural changes in the economy and permit labour 
productivity and the per capita consumption level to increase over time. If on the other 
hand, the timing is wrong, a country may have to go through painful processes of 
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adjustment precisely because it is more  ‘open’ than otherwise. 
 
This would once again suggest that we ought to deal with the problem of openness in 
terms of rate and pattern of growth of output with due recognition to carry out structural 
changes as and when circumstances so warrant. These time-related and conjunctural 
specific aspects which have considerable bearing on the desirable forms of  ‘openness’ 
lead us to adopt an approach which is different from that which is usually adopted in 
formal planning models. 
 
III. Arguments for Free Trade - A Critical Review   
 
Arguments in favour of the ‘free trade’ position can be stated in a compact manner by 
referring back to the two “fundamental theorems” of welfare economics. These theorems 
become relevant to the present discourse if one realizes that ‘trade’ can be considered as a 
means of production. To bring out the relevance of these theorems to this analysis, one 
would further follow Arrow and Hahn (1971) in as much as one would assume that 
domestic factor supplies can be treated as factors ‘private’ to a particular group of firms. 
This is the device that they employ to handle problems related to foreign trade within the 
ambit of general competitive equilibrium analysis.2  Factors as usual, can be treated as 
products with a negative sign. According to the first ‘welfare theorem’ a competitive 
equilibrium, in the absence of externalities and no satiation, constitutes a Pareto 
optimum. The so-called ‘Converse theorem’ is, however, more important from our point 
of view and makes much more stringent demands. According to this ‘Converse theorem’, 
otherwise known as the ‘second theorem of welfare economics’, Pareto-optimum can be 
realized as a competitive equilibrium in the presence of all round ‘Convexity’, provided 
suitable lump sum transfers can be arranged amongst the participants. 
 
If these assumptions hold, then the second theorem is indeed a useful one from the 
planning point of view. If the economy is a small open one, and competitive equilibrium 
exists in the world at large, then the, country is better off under ‘free trade’ than under 
2 See Arrow and Hahn (1971), They write “We will find it convenient to consider some commodities as 
being private to a firm or group of firms ( e.g. managerial ability or in the case of foreign trade, domestic 
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any restricted form of trade, let alone autarky. Only when the country is large enough to 
face downward sloping demand curves in the world market, it may be concluded that 
there is a first best argument for deviation from free trade. This is the essence of the so- 
called ‘optimum tariff’, argument. However, the result is applicable to a single country 
only if the rest of the world behaves as if it were passive and not engaged in retaliation in 
one form or other. On this argument, earnings of internationally immobile factors are in 
the nature of rents, that is they are price-determined. They can fall to zero, as in the case 
of domestically available unskilled labour, under inappropriate demand conditions. It is 
assumed, however, that national authorities can take care of this problem by arranging 
suitable domestic compensatory income transfers, a tall order indeed. 
 
If global allocative efficiency of given primary factors were the sole objective and if 
indeed costless inter-country and intra-country transfers were possible to the desired 
extent, then much of the discussion on commercial policy would become redundant. The 
fact that discussions on commercial policy are very much a live issue, and in fact by no 
means a settled one, would seem to suggest that the basic assumptions underlying the 
models are often violated in practice. What are the sources of major departures from the 
assumptions underlying the above theorem? 
 
One very obvious violation is, of course, the lack of consideration given to an appropriate 
international policy framework governing transfer amongst countries and quite often, 
within countries themselves.  Further, as Bhagwati et al. have argued if structural 
unemployment arises in an open economy aided or accompanied by significant wage 
differentials etc. that is no reason to interfere with commercial policy.  These differentials 
are treated as domestic distortions that Bhagwati et al. conclude ought to be treated at 
their source.  The Arrow-Hahn approach describing them as ‘private commodities’ makes 
their conclusion more transparent.  However, in practice raising resources to finance 
transfer payments leads to very difficult problems for most developing countries.3  
Furthermore, it may be argued that even in the case of small open countries in the 
 
factor supplies”). 
3 See, Anand and Joshi V (1979), for pointing out the crucial role played by the assumption that 
government has complete control over the distribution of income in the context of Bhagwati-Ramaswami 
analysis.  
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absence of such transfers the potentially welfare improving effect of trade holds only if it 
is assumed that a situation of competitive equilibrium exists.  We do not as yet have an 
operationally transparent set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of 
competitive equilibrium.  It is also known that negative external effects can cause 
departure from all-round convexity. Proofs of the existence of competitive equilibrium to 
situations involving non-convexities lack generality and are often highly restricted in 
nature. 
 
The major reason for the breakdown of the convexity assumption is, of course, the 
widespread prevalence of increasing returns to scale.  Numerous empirical studies have 
shown how important increasing returns arise not only on account of the presence of 
indivisibilities.4  As Young and following him mature Kaldor repeatedly argued, 
departures from linear homogeneity could arise even in the absence of indivisibility.  We 
may indicate below some of the leading cases of increasing returns that cannot be put at 
all easily under ‘indivisibility’ rubric. 
  
a) Kaldor’s celebrated ‘pipeline case’, which has to deal with the existence of non-
linearities between cost and capacity arising from the three dimensional nature of 
space. (Kaldor op.cit, and Koopman, 1957) 
 
b) ‘learning by doing’ much emphasised by Arrow in relation to production 
processes, for which enough empirical evidence exists.  This may also apply to 
the activity of consumption itself which is as much subject to learning process in 
certain cases as the activity of production, thus yielding one more first best 
argument for export subsidy (W. Mayer, 1984). 
c) Increasing returns accruing to the economy as a whole as argued by Allyn Young 
who based his theory of economic progress on this point. Young’s argument gives 
rise to a theory of ‘infant economy’ which constitutes a considerable 
4 This contentious issue, was first taken up in a debate between Edward Chamberlin and Nicholas Kaldor. 
Kaldor maintaining at one time that in the presence of all round divisibility, constant returns to scale must 
necessarily hold. He was to change his views very decisively on this point. See N. Kaldor, “The irrelevance 
of Equilibrium Economics”, appendix on ‘indivisibilities and increasing returns’. Kaldor very handsomely 
acknowledges there that Chamberlin was right on this point and he was mistaken.  
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generalisation of the Mill-Bastable case of an infant industry5. 
 
If both consumers and producers learn over time, production processes deviate from 
linear homogeneity, and the economy as a whole develops in terms of a range of human 
skills as well as in terms of institutional arrangements, it is quite clear that we have 
moved a considerable way beyond the scope of two basic theorems of welfare economics. 
 
What can be concluded in regard to ‘free trade’ policy in the light of pervasive increasing 
returns? Paul R. Krugman, who is a leading trade theorist and Nobel Prize winner, has in 
a survey article addressed himself precisely to this issue. (Krugman, 1987) 
 
Krugman noted the work of Dixit, Spence, Stiglitz and others who  tried to model trade in 
the context of Chamberlin-type imperfect competition along with the presence of 
increasing returns.  He carefully noted that in the type of  ‘second-best’ world which 
alone is relevant in the contemporary context, there is no automatic tendency for gains 
from trade to be realised.  While the scope of gains from trade does not necessarily go 
down, the composition of trade changes significantly from inter-industry to intra-industry 
trade.  Furthermore the need for government intervention can no longer be ignored.  
Thus, it is clear from his survey and references cited therein that the discussion of trade 
policy has taken a new turn in contrast to the earlier literature where increasing returns 
and market imperfections were often relegated in trade textbooks to the status of 
inessential modifications of the central argument couched in the context of the Hecksher-
Ohlin paradigm. 
 
While Krugman himself ends up with a justification for free trade, he noted that ‘this is 
not the argument that free trade is optimal because markets are efficient.  Instead, it is a 
sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of thumb in a world whose politics are 
as imperfect as its market” (Krugman, 1987; p. 143).  
5 Curiously enough, Young’s macro-economic increasing returns to scale is in basic sense, much closer to 
the original ideas of List, although list had stated his argument in opposition to what he understood to be 
the message of Smithian economics. Young, as in well known, described his own analysis as a variation on 
the theme of Smith that ‘division of labour is limited by the extent of the market’. Difficulty may in part be 
due to the fact that Smith’s argument on the division of labour are not fully congruent with some of his 
subsequent discussion on prices as allocation instruments. 
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The main reason behind Krugman’s cautionary ending is that sophisticated 
interventionism is likely to be a difficult exercise in political economy.  However, in 
essence, it is difficult to expect, for the reasons that he has elaborated as well as for others 
discussed later, for the world trading system to gravitate to free trading as a generally 
accepted rule of thumb.  Instead the argument is better viewed in terms of the need for 
‘managed trade’.  However, it is necessary to explain this notion in a little detail. 
 
There are several reasons why trade needs to be managed.  These have to deal, in a basic 
sense, with the fact that ‘openness’ can be a mixed blessing.  The point was well 
understood by John Maynard Keynes when he changed his position from being a 
champion of free trade to that of an advocate for ‘national self-sufficiency’, in the midst 
of depression during the 1930s. 
 
‘Openness’ can be found to be a great advantage for an economy for any of the following 
reasons: 
a) It may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialised resources in 
areas of production where the world demand is highly income and price 
elastic; 
 
b) it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of the kind leading to considerable 
upgrading of the quality of local factors of production; 
 
c) it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate certain forces of 
what Leibenstein has described as X-inefficiency; 
 
d) trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to a 
greater share of production accumulation in national income; 
 
e) Trade may facilitate what Schumpeter and, following him, Dahmen have 
stressed so much-namely an accelerated process of creative destruction; 
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In all these cases, we are assuming that payment arrangements are such that there is no 
sizeable deflationary bias in the world economy or in any of the leading countries.  It was 
already noted in section II that Keynes was of the view that the classical theory of 
equilibrating payments arrangements was gravely deficient.  The Bretton Woods system 
was meant to provide a mechanism that coordinated high levels of effective demand 
amongst trading countries.  The system lasted over the period 1945-71 in the “mutilated” 
form that was acceptable to the major parties involved.  Since then the world economy 
and its institutional arrangements have evolved.  In the normal situation, and before the 
current crisis, the beneficial effects of ‘increased openness’ may be considerably 
attenuated due to deflationary adjustments, especially by developing countries, since 
surplus countries have been lending their ‘finance’ to richer deficit countries whose 
savings fall considerably below their investment requirements. 
 
The neoclassical argument that ‘capital’ being more scarce in developing countries, the 
latter will offer a higher rate of return to attract capital from the metropolitan countries is 
conceptually flawed one.  In an interesting article, entitled, “ the need for a 
reconsideration of the theory of international trade”, John Robinson pointed out the 
nature of the fallacy involved.  If, nevertheless, during the 19th century, the system 
operated in a manner that gave a semblance of plausibility to this classical theory, this 
was because the assumptions underlying the theory were not often fulfilled. As she put it, 
“ There was enough unemployment to keep money wage rates in check.  There were 
massive migrations reallocating the supply of labour between countries of low and high 
economic opportunity; and there was a continuous, though fluctuating, flow of 
international investment. (Robinson, 1973)   
 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that there are situations in which increasing 
the openness of the economy may harm the quality of locally available factors.  This 
leads to the opposite syndrome to that which we mentioned earlier.  For example the 
adverse impact of British cotton textiles on Indian cotton weavers in the 19th century and 
the British experience of de-industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s are cases in point. 
Hirschman in particular has expressing strong concern on this matter.  He was not alone 
in made a distinction between ‘specialisation along commodities lines’ and 
  13
“specialization along factor of production lines” (Hirschman, 1971; pp 228-229).  He 
remarked that very few countries would ever consciously wish to specialize in unskilled 
labour, while foreigners with a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship, management, 
skilled labour, and capital would take over these functions, replacing inferior local talent.  
Hirschman was obviously assuming that the country in question was open not only on the 
trade side but also with respect to factor movements- a phenomenon that occurred 
through foreign direct investment.  This occurred in the 19th century on a large scale in 
tropical countries when their so called ‘comparative advantage’ in certain cash crops 
began-a phenomenon that was repeated in the 1960s through the medium of multi-
nationalism corporations specialising in the export of labour-intensive manufactures 
through their offshore locations. 
 
Generally, it has been seen that ‘openness’ works positively if the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ from contacts with the rest of the world are suitably institutionalised, and 
through suitable adaptation on the policy side involving appropriate government 
interventions which make the domestic economy more responsive to change.  The 
experience of Japan and that of the Asian NICs would seem to suggest that home market 
expansion can often trigger off growth-promoting investment which then leads 
sequentially to import and export substitution on highly efficient lines.  In its turn, home 
market expansion may have much to do with increases in food productivity level. Arthur 
Lewis also strongly underlined the importance of food productivity growth as a method 
of overcoming the terms of trade loss suffered by many tropical countries that 
concentrated their exports of beverages, etc. to cater to metropolitan market. 
 
In the absence of a growing home market accompanied by suitable diversification of the 
industrial structure, the effect of ‘openness’ can at best be a ‘once-for all gain’ from 
increased openness.  On occasion it may lead to a subsequent accentuation of the 
economic difficulties of the country that which liberalized its trade and investment 
policies in the expectation of sustained growth but without adequate preparation on the 
knowledge absorption side. 
 
M. Kalecki referred to the situation as ‘ perverse growth’, which has been experienced by 
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certain oil-exporting countries in recent years as.  In neo-classical trade literature, this is 
sometimes called the ‘Dutch disease’, but the phenomenon that we are referring to here is 
much more intimately connected with shifts in distribution of income favouring luxury 
consumption which is often highly import-intensive in contemporary developing 
countries. 
 
It is important at this stage to pinpoint the phenomenon of learning over time as a more 
relevant paradigm for development gains through trade as distinct from the neoclassical 
emphasis on exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. John Stuart Mill was fully aware of 
this dimension in his classical writings on the subject, as was Alfred Marshall whose 
‘Memorandum of Fiscal policy of International Trade’ was mentioned earlier.  More 
recently, L.L. Pasinetti has always been very emphatic on this point. (Pasinetti, 1981; 
Chapter 11) 
 
To drive home this point, it is worth quoteing the following paragraph from Pasinetti, 
“The primary source of international gains is international learning (not international 
trade), where firms in one country are challenged by lower-priced products from abroad.  
They will either learn how to cut down costs or close down.  Some of them, at best, may 
learn and survive.  Furthermore, when a new product is invented in one country, the very 
first thing that all other countries will try to do is to learn how to make the product 
themselves (by buying licenses and paying royalties, if necessary).  Only in the 
temporary learning period, or in the period which may sometimes be quite long in which 
internal demand is not yet big enough to allow the minimum scale required by the new 
methods, will normally be produced in all countries.  The case of agriculture and mining 
is quite different” (Pasinetti, 1981, op.cit, p.259).  
 
Enough has been said to suggest that while the classical and neo-classical arguments for 
‘free trade’ suffer from serious conceptual and operational difficulties, there are indeed 
substantive benefits from ‘economic openness’ which are more robust than the traditional 
neoclassical arguments.  However they can be realised only in specific world economic 
conjuncture coupled with an appropriate set of domestic policies that go considerably 
beyond the limits of commercial policy as traditionally defined.  Two well-documented 
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historical episodes where trade and growth-promoting forces interacted in a positive 
manner were connected with the hegemonic roles played by Britain and US respectively.  
It has been pointed out by economic historians that Britain’s decision to adopt ‘free trade’ 
as the major thrust of their commercial policy helped to trigger the secular boom of the 
second half of the 19th century.  But with changes in geo-political situation, coupled with 
altered industrial leadership consequent on the maturing of major new innovations during 
the second Kondratieff, as described by Schumpeter, led to severe strains towards the end 
of the 19th century, and led to the violent demise of the system. 
 
The financial and trading openness for developing countries recommended as panacea in 
the present world situation is based on a completely ahistorical understanding of growth 
problems in an increasingly interdependent world, an understanding which, on its own 
logic, is by no means free from difficulties as analysed earlier.  It is therefore essential 
that we attempt to analyse the forces which lent the so called ‘golden age of capitalism’ 
its dynamism along with incipient disproportions.  
 
IV. Openness: “Close” versus “Strategic” Integration with the World Economy 
 
The above historical and conceptual analysis of economic nationalism, identified here 
with the optimal degree of openness may be illustrated by considering the post World 
War-II East Asian economic history. 
 
(a) Degrees of openness of the East Asian economies6
 
The virtues of openness, international competition, and close integration with the world 
economy, are stressed in several World Bank flagship publications and in the writings of 
orthodox economists.  By the same token, these scholars also warn against the harm done 
by economic nationalism (protection, import controls, industrial policy measures to 
subsidise specific activities, restrictions on entry of foreign multi-nationals, among other 
things).  The paragraphs below outline empirical evidence bearing on these issues. 
 
6 This section of the paper is based on, and updates material from Singh, 1995 
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To illustrate, the Japanese economy operated under rigorous import controls, whether 
formal or informal, throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  As late as 1978, the total imports of 
manufactured goods into Japan were only 2.4% of GDP.  The corresponding figures for 
manufactured imports for the United Kingdom and other leading European countries 
were at that time of the order of 14 or 15% of GDP.  During 1950-70, the Japanese 
domestic capital markets were highly regulated and completely shut off from the world 
capital markets.  Only the government and its agencies were able to borrow from or lend 
abroad.  Foreign direct investment was strictly controlled.  Foreign firms were prohibited 
either by legal or administrative means from acquiring a majority ownership in Japanese 
corporations. 
 
With respect to the questions of exchange rates and distortions, the Japanese Government 
maintained exchange controls and kept a steady nominal exchange rate with respect to 
the US dollar over almost the whole of the period of that country’s most rapid growth 
(1950-73).  Purchasing power parity calculations by Sachs (1987), using Japanese and US 
price indices, show a 60% real appreciation of the exchange rate during 1950-70. 
 
Thus, despite the strong export orientation of the Japanese economy, it was far from 
being open or closely integrated with the world economy during the period of its fast 
growth.  During that period because of its relatively low level of per capita income it 
could be considered more like a developing country than it did subsequently (Singh, 
1997).  The stories of Taiwan and South Korea, subject to certain modifications, also 
point in the same general direction of strategic rather than close integration with the 
world economy (Amsden, 1989 and Wade, 1990). 
 
(b) Protection and export promotion: alternative interpretations 
 
What was the role of this high degree of protection in the East Asian economies?  
Orthodox economists acknowledge the facts of this protective regime but essentially 
argue that this was generally a negative influence, which was kept in bounds only by the 
government pursuit of export targets, and export “contests.” 
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This interpretation has serious shortcomings.  First, as noted earlier, generalized 
protection was one of the mechanisms used by the Japanese and the Korean governments 
to alleviate the balance-of-payments constraint.  Second, and equally significantly, there 
are both analytical and empirical reasons for the view that protection played an important, 
positive role in promoting technical change, productivity growth and exports in these 
countries.  To appreciate how protection worked at a microeconomic level, consider the 
specific case of the celebrated Japanese car industry.  Magaziner and Hout (1980) point 
out that government intervention in this industry was characterized by three major goals; 
discouragement of foreign capital in the Japanese industry and protection against car 
imports, attempts to bring about rationalization of production, and assistance with 
overseas marketing and distribution expenditure (p.55). 
 
The government imposed comprehensive import controls and adopted a variety of 
measures to discourage foreign investment in the car industry.  Quotas and tariffs were 
used to protect the industry; the former were applied throughout the mid-1960s, and 
prohibitively high tariffs until the mid-1970s.  Moreover, the government controlled all 
foreign licensing agreements.  To make technology agreements more attractive to the 
licensor, it guaranteed the remittance of royalties from Japan.  The policy stipulated, 
however, that continued remittances would be guaranteed only if 90 per cent of the 
licensed parts were produced in Japan within five years.  This is about as powerful a 
domestic content arrangement as one can get. 
  
More generally, protection provided the Japanese companies with a captive home market 
leading to high profits which enabled the firms to undertake higher rates of investment, to 
learn by doing and to improve the quality of their products.  These profits in the protected 
internal market, which were further enhanced by restrictions on domestic competition not 
only made possible higher rates of investment but also greatly aided exports.  Yamamura 
(1988) shows how these protective policies gave the Japanese firm “a strategic as well as 
a cost advantage” over foreign competitors.  In other words, protection, export promotion 
and performance standards were complementary policies. 
 
(c) Foreign direct investment 
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An important feature of both the Japanese and the Korean industrial policy has been the 
discouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI).  Available statistics indicate that 
among developing countries, Korea was second only to India in its low reliance on FDI 
inflows.  Foreign capital stocks totaled just 2.3% of GNP in 1987 in Korea, above the 
0.5% estimate for India, but far below the levels of 5.3% for Taiwan, 17% for Hong 
Kong, a massive 87% for Singapore, 10% for Brazil and 14% for Mexico UN (1993).  In 
the view of the World Bank economists, this discouragement was a self-imposed 
handicap which was compensated for only by the fact that both Japan and Korea 
remained open to foreign technology through licensing and other means.  This raises the 
question that if the Japanese and the Korean governments were as efficient and flexible in 
their economic policy as the Bank economists themselves suggest (to account for their 
long-term overall economic success), how is it they have persisted with this apparently 
wrong-headed approach for so long? 
  
An alternative interpretation is that the approach was perhaps not so wrong-
headed.  It was “functional” within the context of the overall industrial policies which the 
two countries were pursuing.  First, it would have been difficult for MITI or for the 
Korean authorities to use “administrative guidance” to the same degree with the foreign 
firms as they were able to do with the domestic ones.  Second, as UN (1993) emphasizes, 
there is a link between the national ownership of the large Korean firms (Chaebols) and 
their levels of investment in research and development.  Korea has, in relative terms, by 
far the largest expenditure on research and development (R & D) among developing 
countries: 1.9% of GNP in 1988, compared with 1.2% in Taiwan (1988), 0.9% for India 
(1986) and Singapore (1987), 0.5% for Argentine (1988), 0.6% in Mexico (1984) and 
0.4% in Brazil (1985).  The country’s performance in this area outstrips that of many 
developed countries (e.g., Belgium, 1.7% in 1987), but is of course still below that of 
industrial super powers, Japan and Germany, each at 2.8% in 1987. 
  
Third, Freeman (1989) stresses another important advantage of the policy of 
mainly rejecting foreign investment as a means of technology transfer.  This, he argues, 
automatically places on the enterprise the full responsibility for assimilating imported 
  19
technology.  This is far more likely to lead to “total system improvements than the `turn-
key plant’ mode of import or the foreign subsidiary mode.” 
 
(d) Price distortions 
 
Bank economists in their econometric analyses in recent publications use a quantitative 
measure of openness- the degree to which the relative domestic prices in an economy 
differ from international relative prices.  On that measure, it turns out that both Japan and 
Korea were among the least open economies (Miracle Study, p.301).  Relative prices in 
these countries were more distorted than in Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan and 
Venezuela, often held up by the Bretton Woods institutions as prime examples of 
countries which do not “get the prices right.” 
  
To sum up, the experience of Japan and Korea comprehensively contradicts the central 
theses of many World Bank Reports that, the more open the economy, the closer its 
integration with the global economy, the faster would be its rate of growth.  During their 
periods of rapid growth, instead of a deep or unconditional integration with the world 
economy, these countries evidently sought what might be called strategic integration, i.e. 
they integrated up to the point that it was in their interest to do so as to promote national 
economic growth.  Such space for economic policy interventions is unfortunately much 
less available for today’s developing countries. 
 
V. Economic Nationalism and Free Capital Flows.  
 
More than restrictions on free trade, economic nationalism in Asian countries today 
arguably manifests itself most through limitations on the free movement of capital.  This 
is a highly controversial subject where there is strong disagreement between heterodox 
and orthodox economists and where there is perhaps the greatest disconnection between 
economic theory and actual events in the real world.  Neoclassical theory suggests that 
the flows of external capital should be equilibrating by helping to smooth out a country’s 
consumption or production paths.  However, in the real world, exactly the opposite 
appears to happen.  Capital account has been associated with serious economic and 
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financial crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s.  The proponents of neo-classical 
theory argue that the case for free capital flows is no different from that for free trade. 
The former could simply be regarded as a form of inter-temporal trade.       
 
 
V.1. The case for Capital Account Liberalisation 
 
The case for capital account liberalization was authoritatively put forward by Stanley 
Fischer, the former Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, in the 
following terms:   
 
y that the benefits of liberalising the capital account outweigh the potential costs;  
 
y  that countries need to prepare well for capital account liberalization: economic 
policies and institutions, particularly the financial system, need to be adapted to 
operate in a world of liberalized capital markets; and  
 
y  that an amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement is the best way of ensuring 
that capital account liberalization is carried out in an orderly, non-disruptive way, so 
as to  minimize the risks that premature liberalization could pose for an economy and 
its policymakers. (Fischer (1997))  
 
The background to Fischer's statement was a proposal by the IMF Interim Committee at 
the 52nd Annual Meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Hong Kong in April, 1997 at 
which the Committee proposed an amendment to the Fund's Articles of Agreement to 
extend the Fund's jurisdiction to capital movements. This amendment would make the 
liberalization of international capital movements a central purpose of the Fund. As 
Fischer puts it: "In a nutshell, the prime goal of the amendments would be to enable 
the Fund to promote the orderly liberalization of capital movements." (Fischer, 
1997, p.12. Emphasis in the original).  
 
It will be appreciated that under the original IMF Agreements the Fund was mandated to 
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promote only current account liberalization. It had no jurisdiction over a country's capital 
account except "the right to require countries to impose capital controls in certain 
contexts." However, as Fischer admits: "De facto, the Fund has become increasingly 
involved in helping member countries liberalize in a manner that does not undermine 
economic and financial stability."  
 
Fischer suggests that, at a theoretical level, capital account liberalization would lead to 
global economic efficiency, allocation of world savings to those countries best able to use 
them most productively, and would thereby increase social welfare. Citizens of countries 
with free capital movements would be able to diversify their portfolios and thereby 
increase their risk-adjusted rates of return. It would enable corporations in these countries 
to raise capital in international markets at a lower cost.  It is suggested, moreover, that 
such liberalization leads to further development of a country's financial system which in 
turn is thought to enhance productivity in the real economy by facilitating transactions 
and by better allocation of resources.  Some argue that free capital movements will help 
increase world welfare through another channel, namely the transfer of resources from 
ageing populations and lower rates of return in advanced countries to younger 
populations and higher rates of return in newly industrialising economies.  Such resource 
transfers will be Pareto optimal as both rich and poor countries would gain.  
 
Summers (2000) succinctly sums up the core point of the orthodox perspective as 
follows: "… the abstract argument for a competitive financial system parallels the 
argument for competitive markets in general… Just as trade in goods across jurisdictions 
has benefits, so too will intertemporal trade and trade that shares risks across jurisdictions 
have benefits."  
 
However orthodox economists also recognise that there are risks attached to capital 
account liberalization. Markets sometimes overreact or react late or react too fast.  
However, as Fischer notes "While I believe we sometimes see examples of market 
overreaction and unjustified contagion effects, I also believe that capital movements are 
mostly appropriate: currency crises do not blow up out of a clear blue sky, but rather start 
as rational reactions to policy mistakes or external shocks.  The problem is that ,once 
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started, they may sometimes go too far." (Fischer, 1997; pp 4-5) In general, Fisher 
believes that capital markets serve as an important discipline on government macro-
economic and other policies "which improves overall economic performance by 
rewarding good policies and penalizing bad." (Fischer, 1997; p 4)  
 
These arguments for capital account liberalization are initially considered at a relatively 
abstract level in the next section and then in relation to empirical evidence in the 
following section.  The first important point to note is that, as in the case of the neo-
classical argument for free trade, the maintenance of full employment and macro-
economic stability constitute an important prerequisites if the benefits of a globalised 
capital market are to be reaped. Specifically, as Rakshit (2001) suggests, the theoretical 
model of the beneficial effects of free capital movements makes the following 
assumptions:  
 
1) resources are fully employed everywhere;  
 
2) capital flows themselves do not stand in the way of attaining full employment or 
macroeconomic stability; and  
 
3) the transfer of capital from one country to another is governed by long-term returns 
on investment in different countries.  
 
The question whether these assumptions are likely to be valid under the current global 
economic regime is examined below.  
 
V. 2.  The Case Against Free Capital Flows  
 
The theoretical case against the view that unfettered capital movements are essential for 
maximising the gains from trade in goods and services and for promoting world 
economic welfare has been made by a number of economists from different schools of 
thought.  First within the neoclassical tradition itself, Stiglitz (2000) argues that the 
concept of free movements of capital is fundamentally different from that of free trade in 
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goods.  Capital flows are subject to asymmetric information, agency problems, adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  Although such problems may occur also in trade in goods 
and services, they are intrinsic to financial flows and are far more important.  
 
Importantly, there are also diverging views about the price formation process in asset 
markets such as the stock markets and the currency markets.  Orthodox economists 
subscribe to the theory of efficient markets.  Whereby, prices are a collective outcome of 
actions of a multitude of individual economic agents whose behaviour is assumed to be 
based on utility maximisation and rational expectations.  This price formation process is 
thought to lead to efficient prices in these markets.  A powerful counter-view was that put 
forward by John Maynard Keynes (1936) in chapter 12 of the General Theory and which 
is encapsulated in his well known "beauty contest" analogy which highlights the role of 
speculation in determining asset prices.  
 
Thus, in Keynesian analysis, which was subsequently formalized in theoretical 
contributions, price formation in asset markets may often be dominated by speculators or 
‘noise traders’ in modern parlance.  Moreover, theoretical work on Darwinian selection 
mechanisms indicate that the Friedman (1953) assertion that rational investors will 
always wipe out speculators is far from being valid in all states of the world. 
 
Further the critical school emphasises that financial markets are particularly prone to co-
ordination failures and often generate multiple equilibria, some good, some bad.  In the 
absence of appropriate coordination by the government or international authorities, an 
economy may languish in a low-level equilibrium trap, producing sub-optimal output and 
employment levels.  
 
The post-Keynesian economists (see for example Davidson, 2001) take a more radical 
stance.  They put forward analyses and evidence in favour of Keynes' thesis 'that flexible 
exchange rates and free international capital mobility are incompatible with global full 
employment and rapid economic growth in an era of multilateral free trade'.  These 
economists also challenge the orthodox presumption that transparency and availability of 
more information would make the financial markets less prone to crisis.  They point out 
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that the crises are fundamentally due to the fact that the future is uncertain and people 
have different perceptions about it.  
 
Keynes was very sceptical about the ability of the world economy under a regime of  free 
trade and free capital movements to maintain balance of payments equilibrium between 
countries at full employment levels of output.  As Felix (1998) notes, 'Reflecting views 
then dominant among Anglo-Saxon economists, the Bretton Woods Accords were 
devised around the basic thesis that free international capital mobility is incompatible 
with the preservation of reasonably free trade and full employment.'  
 
Thus, the orthodox theory that financial liberalization leads to global economic efficiency 
based on the analogy with free trade is flawed on several counts.  Within the neoclassical 
tradition itself, it is the intrinsic nature of financial contracts which differentiates a market 
for the latter from that of ordinary goods in international trade: financial instruments are 
characterised by assymetric information between borrowers and lenders and since such 
transactions take place over time they are also subject to time inconsistency problems.  
These in turn generate moral hazard, leading to contagion and multiple equilibria which 
can produce pathological outcomes.  The Keynesian and the post-Keynesian emphasis is 
on inherent uncertainty about the future, on speculation and the macro-economic co-
ordination failures at both the national and international levels to which financial markets 
are particularly prone.  
 
 
VI. The Asian Crisis and Capital Account Liberalisation 
 
The Asian crisis of the late 1990s provides almost a laboratory experiment for examining 
the role of capital account liberalization in causing or exacerbating that region's severe 
economic downturn.  Drabek and Williamson (1999) provides evidence to suggest that 
countries which did or did not have economic crisis were differentiated only by whether 
or not they had liberalized their capital accounts.  Most economists would now agree that 
even if premature financial liberalization without adequate prudential regulation was not 
the root cause of the crises in countries such as Thailand, Korea and Indonesia, it greatly 
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contributed to the occurrence of the crisis and to its depth.  Indeed, the economic 
fundamentals prior to the crisis of the affected countries were better than those of India, 
but the latter country was spared the crisis because of its control over the capital account. 
Similarly, China managed to avoid the crisis and continued to have fast economic 
growth. China also had only partially but by no means fully liberalized its capital 
account.  
 
It is argued by some that, even with the acute economic crisis of 1998-1999, Korea with 
its economic openness was a much more successful economy over the long run than 
India.  This argument has some plausibility but it overlooks the crucial fact that Korea's 
outstanding industrialisation record over the previous three decades was not accompanied 
by a liberalized financial system but rather by a highly controlled one.  However, when 
the system was liberalized in the 1990s it was followed by an unprecedented crisis (see, 
also, Demetriades and Luintel, 2001).  
 
Singh (2002) and Arestis and Singh (2010 forthcoming) provide a summary review of 
empirical evidence on capital account liberalization, capital inflows, the growth of GDP 
and its volatility in developing countries.  The review suggests that there is a close and 
robust relationship between liberalization and economic and financial crises.  In the 
circumstances of developing countries there are also strong analytical arguments for both 
its existence and robustness.  On the other hand, the available evidence does not indicate 
that free capital flows necessarily lead to faster long-term economic growth for the 
typical developing country. In view of these facts, Stiglitz (2000) is fully justified in his 
criticism of the IMF for its promotion of capital account liberalization.  Not only is there 
no adequate theoretical or empirical case for such espousal of capital account 
liberalization, there is in fact a strong case against it.  Indeed the economic crises and the 
instability which capital account liberalization are seen to generate, may compromise a 
country's future economic development by inducing capital flight and lowering domestic 
investment and long-term economic growth.  
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VII. Conclusion: Economic Nationalism and Globalization  
 
Economic nationalism, we have seen earlier in our discussion of trade openness, is most 
useful when the world economy is growing slowly and has little prospect for dynamic 
growth.  On the few occasions when the world economy is growing fast or has the 
prospect of growing fast (due for example to technical progress) pursuit of economic 
nationalism may turn out to be a costly mistake.  However, as far as free flows of capital 
are concerned, economic nationalism is likely to be a powerful weapon in general to 
prevent harm to the national economy.  There are relatively few conjunctures when 
economic nationalism with respect to capital flows may do more harm than good to 
developing countries. In this context, it is important to observe the form economic 
nationalism has taken in response to the Asian crisis of the late 1990s.  In view of the 
immense difficulties caused by capital flows, or the lack of these during the Asian crisis, 
one would have expected Asian countries to seek a regime of capital controls in place of 
that of free capital movements.  However, apart from Malaysia, most countries did not 
abandon financial or capital account liberalisation.  In most cases, they did not increase 
but neither did they reduce it significantly.  Instead, they chose to defend themselves 
against unwanted capital movements by building up reserves through current account 
surpluses. Such economic nationalism has proved to be most useful to developing 
countries during the current global financial crisis: the surpluses and reserve 
accumulations have been helpful to many countries in reducing the negative impact of the 
crisis and to recover faster than other countries.   
 
In conclusion, economic nationalism remains a useful concept even under globalization 
but its practical policy application requires a careful analysis of national and international 
economic trends. 
******* 
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